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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TAXATION - EXCLUSION UNDER SECTION 119 GRANTED AL-
THOUGH EMPLOYEE WAS CHARGED FOR VALUE OF QUARTERS
SUPPLIED.-Taxpayer, a physician employed by the Veterans' Ad-
ministration, was required to live in quarters on the hospital grounds.
A charge was made against his salary for the value of quarters sup-
plied. The taxpayer deducted I this amount from gross income on
his return. Section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code 2 allows an
exclusion for the value of lodging furnished for the convenience of
the employer, on the business premises, as a required condition of
employment.3 The Tax Court4 held that the requirement that the
quarters be "furnished" is not met when the employer charges the
employee for the value of quarters supplied. The court of appeals,
reversing the Tax Court, held that the exclusion will lie even though
the employee's salary is subjected to a charge for the value of quar-
ters received. Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958).
Prior to the enactment of section 119 of the 1954 Code there
were no specific statutory provisions concerning the relation of meals
and lodging to gross income.5 Regulations under the 1939 Code 0
provided that if meals and lodging were furnished as part of com-
pensation the value thereof was not excludable from gross income,7
1 The taxpayer's basic salary under his Civil Service classification was
$11,300.12 in 1954 and $12,130.38 in 1955. From his salary his employer, the
Veterans' Administration, deducted $1,147.46 in 1954 and $1,188.86 in 1955
as a rental charge for living on the premises. Taxpayer rented a garage on
the hospital grounds for which he made direct payments which he also at-
tempted to deduct from his return. Section 119, upon which the taxpayer
based his contentions, allows an exclusion from gross income rather than a
deduction. No mention of this error is made in the opinion, the Tax Court
apparently feeling that the net effect of an exclusion and a deduction is the
same. See Boykin v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 813 (1958). The court of appeals
affirmed the Tax Court's decision in disallowing the deduction for the garage
rental, since this was not a required condition of the employment.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 provides:
"§ 119. MEALS OR LODGING FURNISHED FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE
EMPLOYER
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value
of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the con-
venience of the employer, but only if-
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such
lodging on the business premises of his employer as a required condition
of his employment."
s Section 119 allows an exclusion for meals also. In the case of meals,
however, there is no requirement that they be accepted as a condition of
employment.
4 Boykin v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 813, 817-18 (1958).
5 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 11.16, at 53 (1955).
0Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-3 (1951).
7 Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code the value of quarters, heat,
light and laundry furnished to employees of the Veterans' Administration hos-
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whereas if they were furnished for the convenience of the employer s
the exclusion would lie. Difficulty in applying the regulation arose
when the "compensation" and "convenience of the employer" factors
were both presentY To dispel this confusion the Treasury Depart-
ment issued a ruling which chose the "compensation" test as the
determinative factor, the "convenience" test to apply only when the
"compensation" element was not present. 10 Section 119 was specifi-
cally drafted to deal with this problem." In effect, the section did
away with the "compensation" test and added to the "convenience"
test the requirement that the quarters be furnished on the employer's
business premises. In addition, the requirement that the inherent
nature of the employment necessitate that the quarters be furnished
is now couched in the term "condition of employment."
pitals was ruled to be part of the employee's compensation and therefore taxable.
I.T. 2692, XII-1 Cum. BULL. 28 (1932).
8 "'Convenience of the employer' has been . . . interpreted as meaning
not merely the request, direction or pleasure of the employer but that the in-
herent nature of the employment requires that the employee occupy the prem-
ises supplied by the employer, in which the occupation of the designated
quarters becomes an inherent part of the services performed." Hazel W.
Carmichael, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239, 241 (1948). In the following cases
and rulings prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code meals and/or lodging
received by the taxpayer were excluded from gross income under the "con-
venience" test: Harry M. Lees, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 449 (1953) (construc-
tion supervisor); George A. Papineau, 16 T.C. 130 (1951) (owner-manager
of hotel); Lloyd N. Farnham, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 898 (1943) (janitor);
Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937) (resident manager of hotel) ; G.C.M.
14836, XIV-1 Cum. BULL. 45 (1935) (treasury attaches in foreign service);
G.C.M. 14710, XIV-1 Cum. BULL. 44 (1935) (Foreign Commerce Service
employees); I.T. 2253, V-1 Ctumi. BULL. 32 (1926) (domestic servants);
T.D. 3724, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 136 (1925) (army officers); O.D. 814, 4 CuM.
BULL. 84 (1921) (fishermen and canners) ; O.D. 265, 1 Cum. BULL. 71 (1919)
(seamen). The "convenience" test was not met in the following cases:
Robert D. Bartilson, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1023 (1954) (airline employee);
Wilson J. Fisher, 23 T.C. 218 (1954) (hotel entertainer); Hazel W. Car-
michael, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 239 (1948) (assistant auditor and head janitor
of a government housing project) ; Fontaine Fox, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934) (sole
stockholder residing in a corporate-owned residence).
"Convenience of the employer" as used in the 1954 Code, however, means
that which serves a business purpose. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.119(a) -2, (d) Ex-
ample 2 (1954).
9 See, e.g., Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Ellis v. Com-
missioner, 6 T.C. 138 (1946).
10 Mim. 6472 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 15 (1950). When the ordinary factors
which indicate the presence of compensation do not appear, the Commissioner
will look to the "convenience" test to determine whether or not compensation
is present. Ibid. But as a practical matter if the ordinary circumstances de-
termining whether or not compensation is present do not appear, the fact that
the furnished lodgings are for the "convenience of the employer" will permit
the exclusion.
11 See S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), in U.S. CODE CONqG. &
AD. NEws at 4649 (1954). See generally, Comment, 53 MicH. L. REv. 871
(1955), for a complete discussion of the enactment of section 119.
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In situations similar to the Boykin case, prior to the enactment
of the 1954 Code, where the employer charged the employee for the
value of meals and lodging supplied the exclusion was not allowed,
since the courts found the "compensation" element present.' 2 In the
Hern A Martin case, 13 the taxpayer was employed by the Army En-
gineers as a wireless operator. His base pay was 2,100 dollars per
year from which was deducted forty dollars per month for lodging
and subsistence. The board held that where the value of quarters
supplied is considered and treated by the employer as compensation
rather than as an allowance or gratuity it would be taxable to the
recipient.
The issue in the Boykin case was whether the requirements of
section 119 are met when the employee is charged by his employer
for the value of quarters supplied. The Commissioner contended
that the word "furnished" as used in section 119 meant furnished
without charge or cost to the employee. This argument finds direct
support in the regulation applicable to section 119.14 The Court, in
overruling this contention, stated: "We do not believe that the word
'furnished' carries with it the implication that no charge is involved." 15
The Court studied the legislative history of the section and concluded
that if Congress had intended the word "furnished" to mean fur-
nished without charge or cost to the employee, section 119 would
have so specified. 16 The Court found that there are only three tests
that must be met for the exclusion to apply: that the quarters be
1) furnished for the convenience of the employer, 2) on the business
premises, and 3) accepted by the employee as a required condition
of the employment. In effect, the Court is allowing an exclusion
where7-the employee has "received" cash and then remitted it to the
employer for the value of quarters received. The Court favors the
view that substance rather than form is the determinative factor in
the solution of tax problems 17 and in doing so indicates that the fol-
lowing three examples are to receive the same tax treatment under
section 119. Assume that in all the examples, the three tests that the
Court looks to are present.
12 See, e.g., Robert D. Bartilson, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1023 (1954);
Joseph L. Doran, 21 T.C. 374 (1953); Herman Martin, 44 B.T.A. 185 (1941).
Contra, Powell v. White, Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1786 (D.C. Ill. 1958).
1344 B.T.A. 185 (1941).
14 "The exclusion provided by section 119 applies only to meals and lodging
furnished in kind, without charge or cost to the employee. If the employee
has an option to receive additional compensation in lieu of meals or lodging
furnished in kind, or is required to reinburse the employer for mneals or lodg-
ing furnished in kind, the value of such meals and lodging is not excluded
from gross income .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.119(c)-2 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
15 Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1958).
16 Id. at 251-52.
17 Id. at 254.
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1) Employee X receives 10,000 dollars in salary, and in addition
thereto is supplied quarters, the value of which is 1,000 dollars. The
exclusion would be allowed even if the value of the quarters were in-
tended by the employer to be additional compensation to the employee.
This situation falls directly within the wording of section 119.
2) Employee Y receives 10,000 dollars in salary, in addition to
which 1,000 dollars is received as an allowance for quarters, which is
in turn deducted by the employer-in other words, a bookkeeping
device rather than a true "salary" deduction.
3) Employee Z is entitled to 11,000 dollars in salary whether he
lives on or off the premises. This is the situation in the Boykin case,
since government employees are salaried according to their respective
job classifications. Boykin was required to live on the premises be-
cause he was the hospital manager and chief of professional services.
The money he was charged was not an additional allowance, but was
part of his government contract salary.
If the Court were confronted with a situation similar to that in
example 2, there would be sound justification for its decision, since
in substance it is similar to the situation in example 1, the form dif-
ference being in the bookkeeping systems used by the employers. In
example 3, however, the taxpayer is given the benefit of an exclusion,
while others in the same wage classification who live off the employer's
premises are not. The legislative history of section 119 gives no in-
dication that Congress gave any thought to the exclusion from gross
income of the value of lodgings for which the employer was charged;
in fact it indicates rather clearly that Congress was thinking only
about the exclusion from income when the charge element was not
present.""
Closely analogous to example 3 is the case in which the em-
ployee receives a cash allowance in lieu of facilities furnished in kind.' 9
This situation usually occurs when the employer does not have ade-
quate facilities on his business premises. Jones v. United States 20
held that cash payments to an army officer, where subsistence in kind
could not be furnished, were not taxable provided the "convenience"
test was met. The Tax Court in Van Rosen v. Commissioner 21 held
that cash subsistence allowances to civilian employees were taxable
since the taxpayer had dominion and control over the money received.
Saunders v. Commissioner 22 criticized the Van Rosen decision and
Is See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4175 (1954).
19 The regulations impose the requirement that the meals and lodging be
furnished in kind for the exclusion to be applicable. Treas. Reg. § 1.119(c)-2
(1954).
2060 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925).
21 17 T.C. 834 (1951) ; accord, Hyslope v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 131 (1953).
22215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954). The court stated: "[B]ecause the result
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reasoned that if instead of a cash allowance, the subsistence were fur-
nished in kind and met the test for exclusion, the cash allowance in
lieu thereof would be likewise excludable.2 3 At the time of the en-
actment of the 1954 Code the Senate Finance Committee Report 24
stated that all cash allowances are to be included in gross income to
the extent that they represent compensation.2 5 Since the "compen-
sation" test was done away with in determining whether the exclu-
sion is allowed when the meals and lodging are furnished in kind,26
there appears to be a conflict in this area. There seems to be more
justification for allowing an exclusion here than in the Boykin case,
since the allowance is not a part of the employee's salary.
A related area is that of employee fringe benefits 27-a consid-
erable expense in industry today.28 Although these benefits lack the
"charge" element present in the Boykin case, employees often accept
a lower wage because of the facilities and other benefits that are
offered by employers.2 0 The cost of these benefits is an allowable
employer deduction 30 if in fact they are reasonable and necessary.31
in this case should not be dependent on whether meals are furnished in cash
or in kind, we may refer to the principle of convenience of the employer rule
in deciding the classification of this rations allowance just as we may when
meals themselves are furnished." Id. at 772.
23 The Saunders case involved a police officer's subsistence allowance. Sec-
tion 120 of the 1954 Code provided for an exclusion from gross income, not
to exceed $5 per day, for statutory subsistence allowances paid to police officers.
The section was repealed by § 3 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
72 Stat. 1606 (1958). The intention of the legislature was to do away with
the exclusion entirely. However, police officers may deduct allowable away-
from-home travel expenses. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), in
U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6811 (1958).
24 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4825 (1954).
25 At present there are several subsistence allowances which have been held
excludable from gross income. Among them are allowances to government
employees in the Foreign Service, INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 912, rent payments
for clergymen, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 107, and supper money for overtime
workers, O.D. 514, 2 Cum. BULL. 90 (1920).
26 See Treas. Reg. § 1.119(B) (1954).
27 "[F]ringe benefits are goods and services in addition to wage pay-
ments as conditions of employment, as incentives for greater effort, as con-
veniences for the employer, and/or as promoters of employee health, good will
and efficiency." Landman, The Ta.xability of Fringe Benefits, 33 TAXES 173
(1955).
28 See Landman, The Taxability of Fringe Benefits, 33 TAXES 173 (1955).
29 See SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 106, 107 (1955 ed.).
30 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959 INT. Ray. BULL. No. 8, at 8 (holiday
turkeys and hams) ; Rev. Rul. 131, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 112 (employee tornado
relief fund); Slaymaker Lock Co., 18 T.C. 1001 (1952) (employee outings
and dances); Jesse S. Rinehart, 18 T.C. 672 (1952) (employee moving ex-
penses); Paul McWilliams, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 771 (1950) (flowers for
ill employees); Abe Wolkowitz, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 664 (1949) (Christmas
parties).
31 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
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Because of the sudden rise in the variety of these benefits and the
liberal attitude of the Treasury Department in respect to them, they
are for the most part enjoyed tax-free.3 2 Several of them have been
held to be excluded from gross income.33
The Boykin case seems to be in line with the liberal view of non-
taxability of fringe benefits in that it broadens the scope of section
119. It appears that the only sound justification for the decision is
the petitioner's lack of freedom of choice, due to the requirements of
his employment status.
As a simple matter of economics, although it can be said that
the value of subsistence and quarters does not constitute taxable in-
come to the employee when it comes directly within the statute, the
employee has received, tax-free, accommodations which if otherwise
acquired would have required payment therefor out of his taxable
salary. The problem that arises is whether the taxpayer's lack of
freedom of choice is a sufficient reason for allowing the exclusion.
Section 61(a) 34 defining gross income, is a section of broad sweep.
Everything that is encompassed within the phrase "income from what-
ever source derived" is includable in gross income unless a specific
provision authorizes exclusion or other special treatment. In order
to come within the exclusion of section 119 its requirements should
be met to the letter. Whether the other circuits will share the view
taken by the Court in the Boykin case remains to be seen.
32 See generally, Landman, sgpra note 28, at 179. However, the author in-
dicates that the tax-free status of many of these benefits is now in jeopardy.
Ibid.
33 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959 INT. Rrx. BULL. No. 8, at 7 (holiday
turkeys and hams); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 104-06 (employee injury
benefits) 101(B) (2) (A) (death benefit payments to employees' widows);
Mim. 647, 1950-1 Cum. BULL 16 (group health and hospitalization payments
made by employers); S.S.T. 302, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 456 (employee courtesy
discounts); O.D. 514, 2 Cum. BULL. 90 (1920) (supper money for overtime
workers). Other benefits have been held to be includible in gross income:
N. H. Van Sicklen, Jr., 33 B.T.A. 544 (1935) (Christmas bonuses); Treas.
Reg. § 1.74-1(b) (1958) (awards received from employer-sponsored contests).
34 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61
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